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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of land title systems on property values. The
predominant system in the U.S., the recording system, awards title to claimants
over current possessors, whereas the Torrens registration system awards title to
the current owner. In theory, the registration system maximizes property value, all
else equal, but in practice, the systems differ depending on the risk of a claim and
administrative costs. A natural experiment in Cook County, Illinois, where both
systems have existed since 1897, allows a test of the theory. The results, based
on commercial and industrial properties, reveal that parcels tend to self-select into
the two systems based on the predictions of the theory.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: K11, P14, R14
Keywords: Land title system, property rights, recording system, Torrens sys-
tem
 1
A Question of Title: Property Rights and Asset Values 
 
1. Introduction 
Well-defined private property rights are fundamental to market efficiency. As important, 
though often overlooked as an arcane detail by economists, is the question of title—the rule 
used to identify the superior ownership claim from among competing legitimate claims to an 
asset. DeSoto (2000) argues that a title system, regardless of the specific ownership rule it 
maintains, is an essential feature for efficient integration of capital and land markets in 
developing countries. At the same time, Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1998, 2000) show that 
the specific characteristics of the title system can affect both the pace of urban development 
and the pattern of investment in real estate assets, even in developed countries.  
 The theoretical analysis to date focuses on how title system characteristics affect land 
development decisions and land values. This paper extends the analysis to developed real estate 
assets, offering a stylized model showing how differences in title system characteristics affect 
values of different types of assets. Cook County, Illinois, offers a natural experiment well-
suited to empirical tests of the value relationships predicted by the theory. Uniquely, from 1897 
to 1996, Cook County operated two alternative title systems at the same time, allowing real 
estate owners to select the title system for their property. This study uses Cook County 
transactions data to test the implications of the theory for relative asset values across the two 
types of title systems.  
While the focus here is on commercial and industrial real estate, the question of title is a 
general concern. Ownership risk from competing claims arises for durable assets because of 
imperfect records arising from theft or fraud, errors made in good faith, the high cost  of 
verification, or incomplete or lost records. In general, there are three systems for resolving 
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conflicting ownership claims: possession, recording, and registration. The possession rule 
generally requires physical possession of the asset to establish a superior claim to ownership. 
Baird and Jackson (1984) offer the example of Twyne’s Case from 1601, in which the seller of 
a herd of sheep continued to take care of the herd after its sale to a second party. The English 
court interpreted the uninterrupted possession as evidence that ownership had not changed 
hands. A form of the possession rule survives to this day in common law countries in the form 
of adverse possession for real estate, where a previously established owner can lose title by 
failing to retain possession (Baker, et al., 2001).  
The recording system (also known as the American rule in the real estate context) 
awards ownership of an asset to the individual with the earlier claim. This is the rule with 
which most individuals are probably familiar in the U.S. For example, vehicle ownership goes 
to the individual with the prior legitimate claim as revealed by an examination of (public) 
records. Later claims arising subsequent to acquisition by theft, fraud, or error typically are not 
honored, even when subsequent purchasers acted in good faith. Similarly, provenance in 
artwork, old wines, or collectibles relies on (private) records to verify the chain of ownership 
(although, in these cases it is as much to verify or reinforce the claim of authenticity as much as 
clear title).  
The registration system, on the other hand, awards ownership to the individual with the 
most recent claim.1 The English rule of the law merchant awards ownership of an asset to the 
merchant acquiring it in good faith, even if purchased from a thief; the Uniform Commercial 
                         
1
 The Torrens title system is a version of the real estate registration system that includes a method for 
compensating rejected legitimate claimants for the value of their lost claim. See Shick and Plotkin (1978) and 
Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1998, 2000) for further details. Not all registration systems incorporate this explicit 
insurance feature. 
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Code applies a similar doctrine for negotiable instruments in the U.S. (Baird and Jackson, 1984, 
p. 300). 
 Real estate presents an interesting class of assets when it comes to title systems. Both 
the recording and registration title systems currently are used to resolve ownership questions 
for real estate assets, depending on the locale (Shick and Plotkin, 1978). Scotland and most of 
the U.S. rely on the recording title system, while England, most Commonwealth countries, 
many Civil Law countries, and Hawaii and parts of Illinois, Massachusetts, and Minnesota in 
the U.S. use or have used the registration title system.  Therefore, questions about how title 
system characteristics affect asset markets are particularly relevant for real estate assets. 
 Our model focuses on the differences between archetypical registration and recording 
systems. The registration system assigns the current property holder title in the event that a 
competing claim arises. This rule minimizes ownership risk for the current holder as well as a 
new purchaser. Registration, however, requires an affirmative action by a magistrate or land 
court to consummate a transaction, thereby increasing transactions costs. In contrast, the 
recording system awards title to the claimant over the current holder. This rule imposes greater 
ownership risk on current holders or new purchasers.2  At the same time, though, the 
transaction can be completed without the intercession of a magistrate or similar official action, 
and so results in lower transactions costs. The relative advantage of one title system over the 
other reflects the relative ownership risk and transaction cost effects on value and therefore 
varies by property type.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model 
of the two title systems. The theory predicts that asset values vary across title systems so that, 
                         
2
 This risk is due to past errors or fraud in determining title.  The risk is reduced, but not eliminated, by title 
searches, which are conducted with each sale of the property (Baker, et al., 2002). 
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when offered the choice of systems (as in Cook County), asset values include an endogenous 
title selection effect. Section 3 explains the selection correction model for asset values in this 
application. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and report the empirical results, respectively. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theory 
The two property title systems we consider, the recording system and the registration (or 
Torrens) system, differ in the following way.3  Under the recording system, if a successful 
claim is made, the claimant receives title to the property but must compensate the current 
owner for the value of any improvements put in place subsequently. Most landowners purchase 
private title insurance to protect them against such claims.4  In contrast, under the Torrens 
registration system examined here, if a claim is made, the current owner retains title, but the 
claimant is entitled to monetary compensation for the value of the lost asset, to be paid from a 
fund that is financed by fees assessed on those owners who register their property (a form of 
public insurance).  The fundamental difference between the two systems, then, is whether the 
current owner or the claimant receives title to the land in the event of a valid competing claim. 
 The question of interest here is whether one of these systems results in a higher property 
value, holding all other factors constant.  We consider only developed land since all properties 
in our sample are developed, either for commercial or industrial use.5  Let Vi be the observed 
market value of a property under title system i, where i=rec, reg (recording or registration 
system, respectively) which consists of the present value of the returns from the property, R, 
                         
3
 For a more detailed analysis of the investment incentives effects of the two systems on which the model in this 
section is based, see Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1998, 2000).   
4
 Mortgage companies typically require borrowers to purchase title insurance for at least the amount of the 
mortgage (Miceli and Sirmans, 1997). 
5
 Miceli, Munneke, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2002) consider the case of undeveloped land.  
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less the present value of the expected transaction costs arising from future transfers of the 
property under system i, Ti, and the insurance premium (or registration fee), π i, which reflects 
the title risk.  Thus, 
  Vi = R – Ti – π i.        (1) 
 Since the title systems require compensation for either the value of improvements or the 
value of the undeveloped land, we will need to decompose the total market value as follows: 
  Vi = Pi + I,         (2) 
where Pi is the value of the land under system i, and I is the value of the capital improvements.  
Note that (1) and (2) imply      
  Pi = R – I – Ti – π i,        (3) 
which reflects a competitive land market.  Also note that the gross returns from the property, R, 
and the value of improvements, I, are treated as being independent of the title system (i.e., they 
are not subscripted by i).  This reflects the fact that, given full and fair insurance against a title 
claim under both systems, the amount of capital owners of undeveloped land will invest in their 
land will be independent of the title system, and will be efficient.6   
 Consider next the determination of π i under the two systems.  First, under the recording 
system, recall that if a claim is made, the current owner loses title but is reimbursed for the cost 
of the improvements, I.  Thus, his net loss is R–Trec–I.  Letting 
θ
 be the probability of a 
successful claim (which we assume is independent of the title system), and assuming an 
actuarially fair premium, we obtain 
  
π
rec = 
θ (R – Trec – I).        (4) 
                         
6
 Specifically, once a buyer has purchased a parcel of undeveloped land for Pi, he will choose I to maximize R(I) – 
I – Ti – π i, where R(I) is the gross return written as a function of I.  Assuming that the owner treats Ti and π i as 
fixed, his optimal choice of I will solve R'=1, which is efficient and independent of the title system (Miceli, 
Sirmans, and Turnbull, 1998).  Note that there is no moral hazard problem here, despite full insurance, because the 
investment in the land is not lost in the event of a claim even when possession changes. 
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Substituting this into (1) and rearranging yields 
  Vrec = (1– θ )(R – Trec) + θ I.       (5) 
 In contrast, under the registration system, the current owner retains title but must 
reimburse a successful claimant (typically, through the public fund) for the value of the 
undeveloped land.  Thus,  
  
π
reg = 
θ
Preg.         (6) 
Substituting this expression into (3) and solving for Preg yields 
  Preg = )(1
1
regTIR −−+ θ
.       (7) 
Finally, substituting (7) into (2) and rearranging yields 
  )(
1
1 ITRV regreg θθ
+−
+
= .       (8) 
 A current property holder prefers the title system that maximizes the market value of his 
property.  Suppose first that the transaction costs are the same under the two systems—that is, 
Trec=Treg=T.  In this case we obtain from (5) and (8) 
  Vreg – Vrec = )(1
2
TIR −−
+ θ
θ
,      (9) 
which is positive given R–I–T > 0.  Thus, the registration system yields the higher property 
value, all else equal.  The intuitive explanation is as follows.  Under the registration system, the 
cost of a claim to the current holder is the value of the land. Thus, the existence of title risk 
reduces land value like a property tax.  In contrast, under the recording system, the cost of a 
claim to the current holder is the lost future income stream.  In this case, title risk acts like an 
income tax on land earnings.  And since a given percentage income tax reduces value more 
than the same percentage property tax, the cost of a claim is higher under the recording system. 
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 Now suppose that transaction costs under the two systems differ.  This is important in 
practice because the available evidence suggests that the cost of transferring a registered 
property in Cook County is considerably higher than for comparable properties under the 
recording system.  The difference reflects understaffing and other bureaucratic impediments 
associated with use of the registration system (Shick and Plotkin, 1978, pp. 139-142).  Thus, it 
seems likely that, at least for our sample of properties, Treg > Trec.  This obviously gives an 
advantage to the recording system, all else equal.  In the extreme case where there is no risk 
(i.e., θ  = 0), both (5) and (8) become  
  Vi = R – Ti.         (10) 
In a risk-free world, all landowners would prefer the recording system so as to minimize 
transaction costs.  At the other extreme, if 
θ
 = 1, 
  Vreg – Vrec = )(2
1
regTIR −− ,       (11) 
which again is positive.  Thus, when the risk of a claim is very high, the registration system is 
preferred despite the higher transaction costs.7  Now observe that the asset value Vi is 
decreasing in θ  under both systems.  It must therefore be the case that there is critical value of 
θ
, denoted θ *, such that the recording system is preferred for θ  < θ * (low risk properties) 
whereas the registration system is preferred for θ  > θ * (high risk properties).  Since θ   varies by 
property, this self-selection effect can be shown graphically as in Figure 1: Vrec lies above Vreg 
for properties for which 
θ
 < 
θ
* and below for properties for which θ  > θ *.  
                         
7
 This is consistent with the fact that Torrens was first introduced in Cook County in the aftermath of the Great 
Chicago Fire to deal with the loss of official land records (Shick and Plotkin, 1978, p. 139). 
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3. Empirical Model  
 The theoretical model implies that, when given a choice, property owners will find it 
beneficial to register their property under the Torrens registration system when the title risk for 
the property is high, while others will find the recording system beneficial when the title risk 
for the property is low.  Thus, the relative value under the two alternative title systems should 
play a role in an individual’s choice of title system.  The total market value of an improved 
property under the registration system can be written as: 
                  iii uXV 11111 +′+= βα  (12) 
while the total market value of an improved property under the recording system can be written 
as: 
                iii uXV 00000 +′+= βα  (13) 
where siV  is the natural logarithm of the ith property’s selling price, and siX  represent vectors 
of property and location characteristics under title system s.  The individual’s choice of title 
system depends on the relative benefit of each title system choice ( )ii VV 01 − .  Although the 
relative benefit is not directly observable, the title system choice is observed upon the sale of 
the property. Thus, the underlying choice or selectivity model is: 
                 
( ) iiiii yVVI ηθγ −+−= 01*  (14) 
     ( ) ( )( )iiiiii uuXXI 10000111* −+−−−+= γηβαβαγ  
     
**
iii ZI ηω −′=  (15) 
where *iI  is the underlying response variable (I = 1 if *iI  > 0, otherwise I = 0); ω  is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated; and Zi  is a vector of regressors that determine the choice of title 
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system (those found in the value equations ( siX ), as well as other factors that may determine 
the choice of title system ( iy )); and ( )2* ,0~ ση Ni .  Note that the error term of the choice 
equation contains the errors from the total value equations, indicating selection bias.  Thus, in 
modeling the total value, one must account for the non-random selection process underlying the 
choice of a title system; failing to do so would lead to biased estimates of the total value 
parameters. In other words, E(usi|I=s) may not equal zero.   
 To properly analyze the impact of the title system on total value, the empirical model 
must be constructed in a manner that treats title system choice as endogenous and also 
recognizes the potential for selection bias. In addition, the model must take into account that 
total value is not jointly observable under each of the title systems.  The total value equation 
must be estimated conditional on the sample to which it belongs.  The conditional expectation 
of the total value equations can be written as: 
               
( ) ( )( )




Φ
−+==
i
i
ii Z
ZXIVE
ω
ωφ
σβα η11111 1  (16) 
and  
             
( ) ( )( )




Φ−
++==
i
i
ii Z
ZXIVE
ω
ωφ
σβα η 10 00000  (17) 
where φ  is the standard normal probability density function, and Φ  is the standard normal 
distribution function. Note that ησ s  measures the covariance between the error term in regime s 
and the error term of the choice function.  The significance of the parameter on ησ s  is a test for 
selection bias.  If this covariance differs from zero, selection bias is indicated.  Estimating the 
conditional expectation of the total value equations over the appropriate subsample provides 
consistent estimates of sβ , but does not lead to a direct measure of the impact of title systems. 
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 Lee, et al. (1979) provides a general framework for estimating a switching regression 
model with endogenous switching.8 This approach is based on the estimation of an 
unconditional expected total value equation.  In addition to allowing the model to be estimated 
with an endogenous regime choice, it also provides a direct measure of the impact of the title 
system choice.  The unconditional expected total value equation is: 
            
( ) ( ) ( ) 0011 01 Φ=+Φ== iiiii IVEIVEVE  (18) 
where iV is the natural logarithm of the selling price of the ith property, and sΦ  is the 
probability of choosing title system s.   
The theoretical model focuses on property value differences from the title systems that 
arise from title risk and transactions cost differences.  Therefore, we assume identical location 
and physical characteristics on value across title system regimes, so that title system differences 
show up as differences in intercepts. Substituting equations (16) and (17) into (18), 
constraining the slope parameters to be constant across title system equations and using X1i = 
X0i= Xi yields the estimable asset value model  
            
( ) ( ) iiiii XV λφσσααβα ηη +−+Φ−++= 10010 . (19) 
The estimated coefficient on Ф  provides a direct measure of the impact of the title system (i.e., 
the difference in intercepts). The parameter attached to φ   provides insight into the selection 
process. 
 In addition to a direct measure of the impact of title systems, this endogenous dummy 
variable approach also provides insight into the selection process.  The theoretical argument 
indicates that a property in the registration system should have a higher value in that system 
than under the recording system.  Note that it does not indicate a relationship between the 
                         
8
 Heckman (1976) also considers an endogenous switching model that only allows the constant term to shift across 
regimes. 
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absolute magnitude under each title systems (i.e., registered properties need not yield a higher 
overall value).  Although unobservable, the expected total value under the recording system, 
given that the property is under the registration system, is: 
      ( )
Φ
−+==
φ
σβα ui XIVE 00000 1        (20) 
while the expected price under the registration system, given that the property is under the 
recording system, is: 
      ( )
Φ−
++==
1
0 11111
φ
σβα ui XIVE .      (21) 
A comparison of the difference of the expected total value equations within group s (e.g., 
E(V1|I=1) – E(V0|I=1)) provides information on the selection process and whether the choice of 
title system is made in a manner that yields a higher value.  
 
4. Data 
 The empirical analysis is built upon a unique data set drawn from the property 
transactions within Cook County, Illinois.  Cook County is found in the northeastern corner of 
the state and fully encompasses the city limits of Chicago. Within this county, two alternative 
title systems have existed simultaneously from 1897 to 1996.  The Torrens system was 
introduced to the area in response to the loss of nearly all land records in the Chicago fire of 
1871.  In addition, the study makes use of transaction level data, not appraised or assessed 
values.   
 The sales data were compiled by Experian (formerly TRW-REDI) from the real estate 
transfer declarations, site visits, and various other documents. Illinois state law requires that 
real estate transfer declarations be filed with each real estate sale. The sales data provide site 
 12
and improvement characteristics, as well as information on the location of the parcel.9 The sales 
data have been augmented with neighborhood characteristics from a second data source 
obtained from the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC). The NIPC data were 
used to identify quarter sections (a one-half mile by one-half mile square) having a high 
concentration in four particular land uses:  railway, roadway, conservation open space, and 
recreational open space. For example, quarter sections with 20% of the land area devoted to rail 
transportation were identified as having a high concentration of rail activity. (Note that in the 
case of railway actively, it is not possible to distinguish between passenger and freight lines.) 
The NIPC data were obtained for 1990, under the assumption that land uses (i.e., roads, parks, 
etc.) as a percentage of a quarter section remained sufficiently constant over the study period.  
The straight-line distance from each sale to the quarter section identified as containing a high 
concentration of a particular land use was measured. 
 Property index numbers, found within the sales data, helped identify if properties were 
registered using the registration or Torrens system.  To test the accuracy of the property index 
number system, a sample of the Torrens properties were verified using public records from the 
County’s Registrar Office. The data were drawn from two distinct time periods; the calendar 
years of 1986 & 1987 and 1990 & 1991.  The years between these time periods were omitted 
due to problems within the data and the high cost of correcting these problems.  The time 
periods used also provide an interesting backdrop in that they represent a time period of normal 
operation and one a few years prior to the 1996 repeal of the Torrens system within the state. 
                         
9
 For the purpose of this study, all parcels contained within the data set are assumed to be located at the center of 
the quarter section, a one half mile square area, in which they are located. This location assumption allows for the 
easy computation of the straight line distance (in miles) for each sale to particular locations, such as the city center. 
The center of the central business district is identified as the intersection of Madison and State Streets. 
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 The full sample contains 2,363 transactions of commercial and industrial properties.  
Commercial (office/retail) properties make up 70% of the sample.  Of the full sample, only 
206, or 8.72% of the sample, are identified as Torrens properties.  Table 1 provides a statistical 
summary of the full sample and each sub-sample (non-Torrens, Torrens).  On average, Torrens 
properties tend to be located further from the city center.  Although the size of the 
improvements found on a Torrens property is smaller on average than found on non-Torrens 
property, they tend to be located on relatively larger lots. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 The first stage estimates the probit model over the full sample of commercial and 
industrial properties and then uses the probit estimates to estimate the probability of a parcel 
being a registered using the registration system, as well as to obtain an estimate of the selection 
variable.  The second stage estimates separate commercial and industrial value equations 
including the endogenous registration variable and the selection variable constructed from the 
probit estimates.   
 Table 2 reports the title choice equation estimates. The results indicate that location and 
timing characteristics play a significant role in the likelihood of a property being in the 
registration system. Properties sold in the latter time period are more likely to be registered. As 
the repeal of Cook County’s registration system approached, properties were more likely to be 
registered in that system. Properties located further from the city center, as well as properties 
located further from concentrations of recreational areas, are also more likely to be registered. 
As lot size increases, the probability of registering the property decreases.  Registration is also 
more likely as the age of a property increases; this likelihood increases at a decreasing rate. 
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Registration system activity by surrounding properties increases the likelihood of a particular 
property using the registration system, a result consistent with the notion that pervasive title 
problems are not necessarily isolated in individual properties, but may also reflect underlying 
neighborhood-wide title problems.  Although many of the individual parameters are not 
statistically significant, we can reject the null hypothesis that all of the parameters are equal to 
zero at the 5% level. 
 The value equation estimates provide some interesting results. The low frequency of 
registration properties in the sample require that a single probit model be estimated over the 
entire sample.  However, the sample can be split by land use type when estimating the value 
equations.  Table 3 reports the commercial and industrial sample total value equation estimates.  
Overall, the estimated impact of the physical and site characteristics from the commercial and 
industrial estimation are consistent with expectations, as well as being consistent between the 
models. The coefficients on the lot area variables are significantly different from one, 
indicating that the price per unit of land is not constant with respect to lot size, but declines as 
lot sizes increase. This type of value concavity is consistent with previous studies of land 
values.10  As expected, total value increases as building area increases.  The age of the 
improvements is found to have a negative effect on total value, but this effect diminishes as the 
building becomes progressively older. The significance of the parameter on the higher-order 
variable indicates that a greater degree of flexibility is needed than can be achieved if the first-
order variable is used alone. 
 The impact of proximity to the city center is consistent across the models, but the local 
effect of the high concentration of other value factors tends to vary by land use.  The value 
                         
10
 See Brownstone and DeVany (1991), Colwell and Munneke (1997), Colwell and Scheu (1994), Isakson and 
Ecker (2001), McMillen and McDonald (1989, 1991), and Munneke (1996). 
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gradient is found to fall with greater distance from the city center, but the gradient is less steep 
outside of the City of Chicago.  The remaining location proximity variables are measured to 
have a local impact (i.e., are not allowed to distort the entire urban price surface).11  For both 
land uses, total value falls as distance to O’Hare Airport increases.  Values for both land uses 
increase as proximity to rail activity decreases, a result consistent with over allocation of this 
type of land near rail activity.  Commercial land uses are positively impacted by increased 
proximity to concentrations of open space devoted to conservation and recreation.  Price levels 
are found to be higher in the early 1990’s relative to the mid 1980’s for both land uses. 
 The estimates of the endogenous title system and selection variables provide some 
interesting results.  For the commercial land use, the registration system variable coefficient 
estimate is significantly positive.  This result indicates, all else equal, that a property in the 
registration system will have a higher price than if it were in the recording system.  The 
estimate on the selection variable is not found to be significantly different from zero at a 5% 
level.  Comparing the difference in equations (16) and (20) and equations (17) and (21) 
provides insight into the selection process.  These differences reveal that registered properties 
sell for more as registered properties than as recorded properties (E(V1|I=1) > E(V0|I=1)).  This 
suggests that landowners valued the hybrid registration-recording title system in Cook County, 
despite the greater transactions costs associated with registration. However, the comparison 
also indicates that properties in the recording system would sell for more if sold under the 
registration system (E(V1|I=0) > E(V0|I=0)).  This last result is puzzling; it suggests that 
                         
11
 Each of these variables is constructed in a manner which measures the local impact on price. As distance from 
the high concentration increases, the variable increases until the boundary distance is reach. For distances at or 
greater than the boundary, the price surface is not allowed to be impacted by this land use; the variable has the 
value of zero.  The boundary distance of one mile was found by varying its definition and finding the model of 
best fit. 
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property owners in the recording system would have done better to initially register their 
property in the registration system. 
 The industrial results also provide interesting insight into the selection process and its 
impact. The estimate on the registration system variable in the industrial sample is negative and 
significantly different from zero.  While on its own this initially seems like a counterintuitive 
result, the selection process must be considered.  The selection results show that registered 
properties sell for more as registered properties, as was the case with the commercial land use 
model.  The industrial estimates also indicate that recorded properties sell for more as recorded 
than as registered properties (E(V0|I=0) > E(V1|I=0)).  These results show that industrial 
properties are allocated between the title systems in a way that maximizes their value. 
 Although not reported here, we further divided the commercial and industrial samples 
into the two study periods, estimating value equations for each of the four subsamples.  The 
results for the selection and registration system variables were virtually unchanged, with the 
exception that the estimate coefficient of the industrial registered property variable in the early 
period loses significance. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The title system represents the rule used to weigh competing claims to ownership of an 
asset and, as such, is essential for implementing private property rights. This paper analyzed 
two archetypical systems, registration and recording, offering a stylized model showing how 
differences in title system characteristics affect values of different types of real estate assets. 
The registration system minimizes ownership risk for the current holder but typically entails 
higher transactions costs. In contrast, the recording system imposes greater ownership risk on 
current holders but results in lower transactions costs. The relative advantage of one title 
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system over the other reflects the relative ownership risk and transaction cost effects on value 
and therefore varies by property type and land parcel.   
We used commercial and industrial property transaction data from Cook County, 
Illinois, to test this fundamental prediction of the theoretical model in a unique setting in which 
both registration and recording systems operated side-by-side. The empirical results reveal that 
properties tend to sort systematically into the two title systems, generally following a self-
selection process consistent with the theory.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Commercial and Industrial Property Transactions, Cook County, Illinois 
               
    Full  Full  Rec.  Rec.  Reg.  Reg. 
    Mean  St Dev  Mean  St Dev  Mean  St Dev 
               UCBDi   Distance to central business district (in miles)  10.5615  6.4659  10.2183  6.3093  14.1554  6.9876 
               CHICAGOi  Property located within Chicago city limits  0.5683  0.4954  0.5879  0.4923  0.3641  0.4823 
               UOHAREi  Distance to O’Hare (in miles)  12.3266  6.3104  12.4176  6.2018  11.3738  7.3010 
               UOHARE_Di  1, if UOHAREi < 5; 0, else  0.0880  0.2834  0.0825  0.2752  0.1456  0.3536 
               
UROADi  
Distance to high concentration of roadway activity; 0, 
else  3.6110  2.0837  3.6096  2.0857  3.6257  2.0679 
               UROAD_Di  1, if UROADi < 1; 0, else  0.0724  0.2591  0.0728  0.2598  0.0680  0.2523 
               URAILi  Distance to high concentration of railway activity; 0, else  3.6079  2.9905  3.5016  2.9228  4.7219  3.4394 
               URAIL_Di  1, if URAILi < 1; 0, else  0.1468  0.3540  0.1521  0.3592  0.0922  0.2901 
               
UCONi  
Distance to high concentration of open conservation 
space  2.6323  2.0837  2.7005  2.1200  1.9186  1.4817 
               UCON_Di  1, if UOPEN_CONi < 1; 0, else  0.2027  0.4021  0.1943  0.3957  0.2913  0.4555 
               URECi  Dist. to high concentration of open recreational space  1.1886  0.6078  1.1753  0.6049  1.3273  0.6218 
               UREC_Di  1, if UOPEN_RECi < 1; 0, else  0.3479  0.4764  0.3561  0.4789  0.2621  0.4409 
               TBAi /10000  Total building area (sq ft/10000)  1.3486  3.4146  1.3879  3.5251  0.9375  1.8619 
               LOTi  Lot area of the parcel (sq. ft.)  24,237  67,237  24,067  66,716  26,025  72,614 
               AGEi  Age of improvement (in yrs)  43.8917  27.3774  44.4817  27.6524  37.7136  23.4953 
               LU_COMi  1, if commercial land use; 0 else  0.6961  0.4600  0.6973  0.4595  0.6845  0.4659 
               LU_INDi  1, if industrial land use; 0, else  0.3039  0.4600  0.3027  0.4595  0.3155  0.4659 
               YROS8687i  1, if property sold in 1986 or 1987; 0, else  0.4799  0.4997  0.4840  0.4999  0.4369  0.4972 
               YROS9091i  1, if property sold in 1990 or 1991; 0, else  0.5201  0.4997  0.5160  0.4999  0.5631  0.4972 
               REGRENSi  1, if property sold as Registered property; 0, else  0.0872  0.2822  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000 
               
REGCONi  
1, if the number of Registered property within a mile is >  
5, 0 else  0.5036  0.5001  0.4780  0.4996  0.7718  0.4207 
               CDFi  Probability Registered - Cumulative distribution function  0.0873  0.0850  0.0787  0.0735  0.1778  0.1322 
               SELECTi  Selection Variable  0.1391  0.0930  0.1306  0.0875  0.2283  0.1018 
               Sample Size    2363    2157    206   
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Table 2: Estimation Results – Title System Choice Equation* 
     
 
   
Probit 
 
   
Reg. =1 
     Intercept    -1.6880 
    (0.002) 
     UCBDi   Distance to central business district (in miles)  0.0431 
    (0.011) 
     UCBDi (1-INi)    0.0127 
    (0.297) 
     LnLOT
 i  Natural logarithm of lot area  -0.1132 
    (0.040) 
     TBAi / 10000  Total building area (sq ft/10000)  -0.0077 
    (0.776) 
     AGEi  Age of improvement (in yrs)  0.0136 
    (0.048) 
     AGE_SQi  AGEi squared  -0.0002 
    (0.024) 
     OHAREi  UOHAREi – 5, If UOHAREi < 5  -0.0139 
  0, else  (0.867) 
     ROADi  UROADi – 1, If UROADi < 1  -0.3624 
  0, else  (0.254) 
     RAILi  URAILi – 1, If URAILi < 1  -0.0737 
  0, else  (0.761) 
     CONSERVi  UCONi – 1, If UCONi < 1  -0.2381 
  0, else  (0.096) 
     RECREi  URECi – 1, If URECi < 1  0.5008 
  0, else  (0.006) 
     YROS9091i  1, if property sold in 1990 or 1991; 0, else  0.1673 
    (0.043) 
     REGCONi 
 
1, if the number of Registered property within 
a mile is >  5 
 
0.8057 
    (<.001) 
     
  Likelihood Ratio  187.70 
    (<.001) 
     
 *Note:  p-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results –Total Price Equation* 
       
 
  
 Com.  Ind. 
       Intercept    8.1596  8.2971 
    (26.30)  (23.01) 
       UCBDi   Distance to central business district (in miles)  -0.0569  -0.0636 
    (7.73)  (6.09) 
       UCBDi (1-INi)    0.0219  0.0383 
    (5.23)  (5.06) 
       lnLOT
 i  Natural logarithm of lot area  0.5001  0.4531 
    (13.99)  (12.57) 
       TBAi / 10000  Total building area (sq ft/10000)  0.0956  0.0874 
    (4.46)  (6.12) 
       AGEi  Age of improvement (in yrs)  -0.0133  -0.0223 
    (4.91)  (5.12) 
       AGE_SQi  AGEi squared  0.0001  0.0002 
    (4.15)  (4.12) 
       OHAREi  UOHAREi – 5, If UOHAREi < 5  -0.0946  -0.0572 
  0, else  (2.06)  (1.99) 
       ROADi  UROADi – 1, If UROADi < 1  -0.1163  -0.0285 
  0, else  (0.61)  (0.19) 
       RAILi  URAILi – 1, If URAILi < 1  0.8253  0.3104 
  0, else  (10.29)  (2.42) 
       CONSERVi  UCONi – 1, If UCONi < 1  -0.1191  0.0140 
  0, else  (2.01)  (0.17) 
       RECREi  URECi – 1, If URECi < 1  -0.3242  -0.2034 
  0, else  (4.89)  (1.59) 
       YROS9091i  1, if property sold in 1990 or 1991; 0, else  0.1811  0.2068 
    (5.95)  (4.65) 
       CDFi  Endogenous Registration variable  2.1204  -2.3716 
    (3.66)  (2.88) 
       SELECTi  Selection Variable  -0.9404  3.3835 
    (1.80)  (4.24) 
       
  Adj R-sq  0.5541  0.6281 
       
 *Note: The dependent variable is the log of sales price. The Lee, et al. (1980) error 
adjustment is used to calculate the asymptotic t-statistics reported in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 1.  Choice between title systems as a function of title risk. 
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